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Individual Grievance Procédures in 
United Nations Secrétariats 
Yves Beigbeder 
The author examines the particular way by which grievances 
of the 46 000 United Nations employées are settled. 
United Nations organizations, in spite of their lofty social objectives, 
are no more immune to internai disputes between employées and employers 
than national bureaucracies or private enterprises. 
Like many firms in the national context, they hâve set up formai 
grievance procédures to deal promptly and systematically with disputes, in 
order to prevent individual problems from growing into collective claims. 
For the employée, a grievance procédure is a guarantee that he has a 
recourse against arbitrary treatment, injustice, or administrative error, and 
that his complaint will be reviewed. 
Unlike national administrations or firms, international organizations 
are not subject to national labor laws, and their employées cannot appeal to 
national civil or labor courts for redress. Ail the employée/employer rela-
tions in international organizations are regulated by staff rules and régula-
tions which are decided upon by the collective will of member countries, sit-
ting in governing bodies, and implemented by the secrétariat heads and their 
administrative chiefs. As employées recruited from more than 100 différent 
countries could not be subjected to the labor législation of only one coun-
try, employment contracts, salary and allowances, pensions, discipline, per-
formance évaluation, grievance and recourse procédures and ail other 
aspects of personnel management in UN organizations were created as an 
autonomous System, inspired by but independent from national schemes.1 
* BEIGBEDER, Y., Doctor in Law, World Health Organization, Geneva. 
** The author has written this article in a personal capacity. 
î Inspiration came initially from the personnel administration expérience of the League 
of Nations, itself influenced by the British and French civil service traditions: for instance, the 
notion of a career international civil service, impartial and independent from Member Govern-
ments. UN organizations, created after World War II, were then heavily influenced by U.S. 
administrative concepts, such as rank-in-post classification and recruitment on the basis of 
detailed, specialist-oriented post descriptions. 
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Grievances of the 46,000 UN employées may be settled by conciliation 
or médiation, reviewed by internai appeal bodies and adjudicated by inde-
pendent international labor courts, the UN and ILO Administrative Tri-
bunals. Grievances are thus finally settled by labor courts and not by arbi-
tration, a current practice in Switzerland and other continental European 
countries where the defunct League of Nations was created, and where most 
of the UN specialized agencies are situated. 
CONCILIATION OR MEDIATION 
In ail UN organizations, the employée may informally appeal to the 
source of his discontent, supervisor or personnel department. However, the 
employée is then alone against the hierarchical or administrative authority 
and his claim for redress may go unheeded. 
To assist the employée, the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
has a review procédure, while three other large agencies hâve appointed an 
Ombudsman as staff mediator. UN has set up a panel to investigate alleged 
discriminatory treatment. 
THE ILO REVIEW PROCEDURE 
Based on an industrial pattern, this procédure allows the employée to 
be assisted by a union représentative. The complaint is addressed to the 
Chief or Personnel if the employée considers that he has been treated incon-
sistently with the Staff Régulations or the terms of his contract. If he claims 
that he has been subjected to arbitrary treatment by a supervisor, the review 
is taken up with this supervisor or his chief.2 
The ILO Staff Union représentative plays the rôle of a shop steward in 
dealing with individual grievances. While other UN organizations hâve not 
formally recognized this rôle in their staff rules, their staff associations or 
union représentatives also assist employées, particularly those in the lower 
ranks, in having their grievances considered and hopefully settled. 
The ILO administration is satisfied with the way this procédure works 
in practice. Because of its informality, however, no statistics on its use or its 
results are available. The procédure fulfils the following requirements: 
— a procédure as loosely and informally constructed as is compatible with 
a definite obligation for management to submit to it; 
2 ILO Staff Régulations, article 13.1 and Annex IV, Part A. The ILO has 2,684 
employées. 
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— the aggrieved party may demand without risk of reprisai that his 
grievance be discussed with him by those in whose power it lies to 
remove it; 
— the grievant may be assisted by an independent and qualified représen-
tative who can deal with the supervisor, or personnel, as an equal; 
— this représentative has the moral authority to tell the grievant his 
grievance is unfounded. 
Other UN organizations hâve opted for an Ombudsman. 
OMBUDSMAN 
A panel of mediators was created in UNDP in 1973, and individual om-
budsmen were appointed in WHO in 1974 and UNESCO in 1976.3 
The Ombudsman's main rôle is to assist staff members individually 
with problems or grievances related to their employment or working condi-
tions, and their relations with chiefs and colleagues. He may also investigate 
collective problems, propose improvements in employment or working con-
ditions. He counsels and proposes, but he does not décide. 
A staff member of his organization, the Ombudsman is appointed to 
this function by the Executive Head, to whom he reports. He is released 
from his normal duties, full or part-time. As an Ombudsman, he has access 
to ail pertinent documents and files. He is bound by professional secrecy. 
In the period April 1979-March 1980, the WHO Ombudsman dealt, on 
a half-time basis, with 61 individual cases initiated by employées at ail 
levels, i.e., approximately 5% of the regularly employed manpower at the 
organization headquarters. Twelve of thèse cases concerned relations at 
work between colleagues, or between employées and supervisors. The other 
49 related to employment conditions, performance, transfers, promotions, 
terminations. In UNDP and UNESCO also, most cases relate to career, 
employment and performance. Only 4% concern salary questions. 
In his work, the Ombudsman interfères with management and super-
visors' responsibilities: if ail supervisors are good supervisors, if manage-
ment is fair and accessible, if personnel management is dynamic and flexi-
ble, there should be no need for an Ombudsman. However, no organization 
is perfect and, particularly in large bureaucracies, an Ombudsman may fill a 
3 The International Monetary Fund, which does not belong to the UN common system, 
also has an Ombudsman. UNDP (United Nations Development Program) has 5,155 em-
ployées, WHO (World Health Organization), 4,378, and UNESCO (United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization), 3,365. 
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need for confidential counselling and third party intervention in interper-
sonal and administrative conflicts. This need is more évident in a multina-
tional environment, where expatriation, cultural, educational and linguistic 
factors may cause or aggravate bureaucratie hassles. 
For the WHO administration, the Ombudsman is deemed useful as an 
independent and confidential staff counsellor and as a conciliator. His rôle 
centers on problem prévention and solution and stops whenever a formai 
complaint is lodged with an internai appeal's body or to an Administrative 
Tribunal. 
Selecting the right person as an Ombudsman is not easy. This sensitive 
job demands good judgment, impartiality and discrétion, as well as the true 
spirit of conciliation. It may be wise to consult the employées, or the union, 
before the appointment is made. The WHO appointment process includes 
nomination of candidates by the employées, staff association and Director 
General, the sélection of 3 names agreeable to both the association and the 
Director General, followed by the secret ballot élection by ail the 
employées. To ensure success, management must be committed to give the 
Ombudsman its full and honest coopération. It must also be prepared to 
reconsider its position in individual cases and accept compromises when 
warranted. 
The introduction of an Ombudsman in WHO was initially feared by 
some staff association représentatives as a potential rival. In practice no 
conflict has arisen. Some employées call on the Ombudsman for help, 
others prefer support from the staff association, others use the services of 
both instances simultaneously or in succession. 
The main point is that an employée in difficulties may hâve access to a 
neutral and respected person, independent from management, for a con-
fidential talk, advice or intervention, without fear of damaging his own 
position. 
UN PANEL 
In December 1978, the UN Secretary General appointed five staff 
members to serve as members of a "Panel to investigate allégations of 
discriminatory treatment in the UN secrétariat''. The members worked in-
dividually except for difficult cases which were reviewed by the panel. They 
investigated 65 cases in 14 months (there are 4,600 UN staff members in 
New York). Of thèse, they solved 9 informally, 18 were only inquiries, 17 
were not retained as no discrimination was found and the others are pen-
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ding. Although the compétence of this panel is limited, the number of cases 
relatively small, and the proportion of cases resolved low, the mère fact that 
such a body exists shows to the employées that management is willing to 
deal with certain types of problems and to hâve them publicized. 
According to the first report of the panel,4 which was distributed to the 
staff, 40% of the cases related to personality conflicts, 25% to sex 
discrimination, 6% to nationality and 5% to race issues. Sources of dif-
ficulties were attributed to communications failures, management in-
decisiveness, favoritism or incompétence. 
According to a récent interagency study,5 thèse varied conciliation pro-
cédures play a useful rôle in reducing the need for formai appeals in the 
larger UN secrétariats. Such procédures are not available to employées in 
the smaller organizations, where familiarity and an easier access to senior 
management levels alleviate interpersonal communication problems. 
FORMAL APPEAL BODIES 
If conciliation or médiation fails, the complainant may formally appeal 
against a final administrative décision or action to an advisory board with 
employée participation.6 
Appeals may be lodged against disciplinary action or other ad-
ministrative décisions, on the grounds that the action or décision resulted 
from personal préjudice on the part of a supervisor or another responsible 
officiai, incomplète considération of the facts, or failure to observe or apply 
correctly the provisions of the staff régulations, or rules or the terms of his 
contract. In ILO, a complaint may also be filed if the employée has been 
subjected to arbitrary treatment by a supervisor.7 
The rôle of the board is to review the written pleas of the appellant and 
of the administration, to obtain and study ail relevant documentation, if 
necessary hear both parties and witnesses, and submit a report recording 
facts, findings and recommendations to the chief of the secrétariat for his 
décision. 
While ail boards hâve management and employées' représentatives, 
4 UN Information Circular ST/ IC/ 81 /7 of 22 January 1981. 
5 UN doc. ACC/1981/PER/45of 8 January 1981 on "Internai Recourse Procédures". 
6 UN Staff Rules 111.1, .2, and .3 -- FAO Staff Rule 303.11, .12, and .13,-- ILO Staff 
Régulations art. 10.5 and Annex IV, Part B, -- UNESCO Staff Régulation 11.1, Rule 111.1 
and Annex A, - WHO Staff Rule 1230. 
7 WHO Staff Rule 1230.1 and ILO Staff Régulations art. 13.2. 
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their composition varies in the various organizations. They hâve 5 members 
in the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), ILO, UNESCO and at 
WHO headquarters, 3 in UN. The employées' représentatives (1 in UN and 
2 in the other agencies) are elected by ail the staff, except for the ILO 
Board, where they are appointed by the Staff Union Committee. The other 
members are appointed by the executive head, who also appoints the chair-
man after consultation with the staff représentatives. In FAO and 
UNESCO, the chairman is appointed by the governing body outside the 
secrétariat, traditionally an Ambassador in Rome (FAO) and a French 
Councillor of State in Paris (UNESCO). In thèse organizations, the in-
dependent status of the chairman reinforces the independence and credibili-
ty of the Board in contrast with the other agencies, where ail the boards' 
members are members of the secrétariat subject to the authority of the Ex-
ecutive Head. 
Expérience shows that internai appeal boards play a positive rôle. 
Through this formai grievance process, the individual complainant is placed 
on an equal basis with the powerful administration. The board vérifies the 
facts, obtains and reviews relevant documentation, hears both parties if re-
quested, may call witnesses. Its knowledge of the organization, its rules, 
pratices and internai personal relations helps board members to understand 
the problems, and find compromise solutions which may give a degree of 
satisfaction to the complainant and be acceptable to the chief executive. In 
some cases, conciliation is achieved before the hearing, or even during a 
hearing, and the appeal is withdrawn. For instance, in 1979, out of 15 ap-
peals submitted to the WHO headquarters Board of Inquiry and Appeal, 7 
were withdrawn before the hearing, and one during the hearing as a resuit 
of conciliation between the two parties. 
Boards review cases in law (hâve rules and contract provisions been 
properly applied?) and in equity. They act as filters: if a case is settled to the 
appellant's satisfaction, the case ends there. If his case has been rejected by 
a board as unfounded or frivolous, an appellant may décide to stop his 
litigation. 
If the case is carried to the Administrative Tribunal, the board's report 
provides the Tribunal with an analysis of the case and documentation which 
would not otherwise be available. 
The Chief Executive is not bound to accept the Board's recommenda-
tions. For instance, in 8 appeal cases reviewed by the WHO headquarters 
board in 1978, the board accepted the appellant's claims in full in 4 cases, in 
part in 2 cases and rejected the other two cases. In the same 8 cases, the 
Director General then accepted the appellant's claims in full in 2 cases, in 
part 2 cases, and rejected the other 4 cases. 
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THE UN AND ILO ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 
In spite of their value as fact-finding and case-screening bodies, inter-
nai appeals boards hâve their limitations for the appellant and the organiza-
tion. They do not décide, they only address recommendations to the ex-
ecutive head, placed in the uncomfortable position of judging over his own, 
or his subordinates' décisions. 
Due process is only assured through a recourse to an independent 
Court of justice, in the interest of both parties. The employée is then 
assured that his complaint will be examined in law by a specialized and in-
dependent body, not subjected to the authority of the chief executive, and 
that his rights will be recognized. The Organization is protected against un-
justified claims from employées, and against pressures from member 
Governments on behalf of their nationals. 
For historical reasons, the UN System of organizations has two Ad-
ministrative Tribunals. UN, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) and the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
(IMCO) hâve accepted the compétence of the UN Administrative Tribunal, 
and the other specialized agencies, that of the ILO Tribunal. To complicate 
matters further, complaints alleging non-observance of terms or régulations 
by the UN Pension Board can only be addressed to the UN Tribunal so that 
a WHO employée, for instance, may hâve to appeal to both tribunals: to the 
UN Tribunal to décide on a pension issue, and to the ILO Tribunal to 
décide on an employment dispute.8 
The ILO Tribunal has succeeded the League of Nations Tribunal, 
created in 1927; the UN Tribunal was created in 1949.9 The former sits in 
Geneva, the latter mostly in New York, occasionally in Geneva. 
Why two Tribunals ~ or why did the ILO Tribunal not disappear in 
favor the UN Tribunal? No candid story has yet explained this judicial 
duplication, but several probable reasons can be given: ILO's natural wish 
to retain its own Tribunal, which as the League Tribunal initiated a 
respected jurisprudence - geographical proximity of the specialized agen-
cies' headquarters (Geneva for WHO, the International Telecommunica-
8 See article 9 of the Régulations of the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund. In re Aouad, two 
judgments of the UN Tribunal (No. 224 and 226) and one of the ILO Tribunal (No. 309) were 
required to décide on a Pension/contract termination complaint. 
9 Its Statute was adopted by the Assembly of the League of 26 September 1927 and 
came into force on 1 January 1928. The Statute of the ILO Tribunal was adopted by the Inter-
national Labour Conférence on 1 October 1946 and confirmed on 10 July 1947. The Statute of 
the UN Tribunal was adopted on 24 November 1949 by resolution of the UN General Assembly 
351A(IV). 
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tions Union (ITU), the World Meterological Organization (WMO), the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); Rome for FAO; Bern 
for the Universal Postal Union (UPU); Paris for UNESCO; Vienna for the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations In-
dustrial Development Organization (UNIDO)) to the ILO Tribunal site in 
Geneva, resulting in lower costs ~ WHO's initiative in 1949 to choose the 
ILO Tribunal "pending définitive arrangements for the use of the UN 
Tribunal" (WHO Staff Rule 1240.1), example followed by the other agen-
cies -- fear of the political interférence of the UN General Assembly over the 
UN Tribunal, a fear which was proved right when the Assembly suspended 
in 1953 the payments of indemnities ordered by the Tribunal to 21 UN staff 
members of U.S. nationality who had been terminated for "disloyalty" to 
their governement during the McCarthy witchhunt era, and decided to limit 
the right of the Tribunal to grant indemnities and to allow judgments to be 
reviewed by the International Court of Justice.10 
In 1978 the UN General Assembly requested the Executive Heads of 
the UN organizations to study the feasibility of establishing a single 
Tribunal. This request was caused by an apparent contradiction between an 
Advisory Opinion of the ILO Tribunal Judge and a UN Tribunal Judgment 
both given in 1978.n In 1979, the General Assembly adopted a more modest 
and pragmatic objective, "to progressively harmonize the statutes, rules 
and practices of the two Tribunals," while still aiming at later unification 
(Resolution 34/438). 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO TRIBUNALS 
Even though the two Tribunals hâve différent Statutes, récent studies 
hâve shown that no substantial divergences of jurisprudence hâve occurred 
in the more than 30 years of their parallel existence.12 
io See Georges LANGROD, «La fonction publique internationale», Sythoff Leyde, 
1963, pp. 229-234. See the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 13 July 
1954 and the General Assembly Resolutions 888 (IX) of 17 December 1954 and 957/X of 
8 November 1955. 
n UN General Assembly Resolution 33/119 (1978). The Advisory Opinion of the ILO 
Judges was rendered on 16 May 1978 and the UN Tribunal Judgment no. 236, Belchamber, on 
20 October 1978. See Yves BEIGBEDER, «Note sur l'avis donné le 16 mai 1978 par les mem-
bres du Tribunal Administratif de l'OIT», Annuaire français de droit international, Paris, 
1978, pp. 476-478. 
12 See Gurdon W. WATTLES, "Harmonization of Administrative Tribunals and the 
Aim of Establishing a Single Tribunal", Bulletin of the International Civil Service Commis-
sion, vol. 2, no. 1, February 1980, and Secretary-General's Report to the General Assembly, 
doc. A/C.5/34/31. See also "Comparative Analysis of the Statutes of the Administrative 
Tribunals of the ILO and of the UN", by J. LEMOINE, ILO, doc. CCAQ/PER/WGRP/R.2 
of 15 June 1979. 
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The rôles of both Tribunals are defined in similar terms: they are com-
pétent to hear and dispose of complaints alleging non-observance of terms 
of appointment and relevant Staff Régulations and Rules. However, as 
already noted, the UN Tribunal has exclusive compétence to hear com-
plaints alleging non-observance of the Rules of the UN Joint Staff Pension 
Fund. 
The ILO Tribunal consists of 3 judges and 3 deputy judges,, while the 
UN Tribunal has 7 members. In both Tribunals, only 3 judges sit in any par-
ticular case. 
The ILO Tribunal judges are elected by the International Labour Con-
férence, on the recommendation of the Governing Body where they are 
nominated by the Director General. UN Tribunal members are elected by 
the General Assembly on présentation by governments. While the ILO 
judges are ail experienced légal practitioners (the three titular judges hâve 
sat on the Suprême Court of their country), 5 of the 7 UN Tribunal 
members are diplomats rather than lawyers. 
When they find the complaint well-founded, either Tribunal may order 
the rescinding of the décision contested, or the spécifie performance of the 
obligation invoked. In the case of the ILO Tribunal, if rescinding or spécifie 
performance is not possible or advisable, the Tribunal may award the com-
plainant financial compensation for material or moral damage. The ILO 
Tribunal décides whether or not to give the option of financial compensa-
tion to the organization, while the Statute of the UN Tribunal leaves this 
option to the Secretary General. In practice, only twice in 30 years has the 
ILO Tribunal ordered re-employment of an appellant without the option of 
paying damages for illégal termination. 
The amount of financial compensation which the ILO Tribunal may 
award is not limited, while the UN Tribunal is restricted to a maximum of 2 
years net base salary of the applicant, barring exceptional circumstances. 
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS 
Judgments of both Tribunals are subject to review by the International 
Court of Justice. For ILO Tribunal judgments, a request for an advisory 
opinion of the Court can only be submitted by one party, i.e., the Govern-
ing Body of the ILO or of the other UN organizations having recognized the 
jurisdiction of this Tribunal. The other party, the appellant, has no such 
recourse. For UN Tribunal judgments, a review may be initiated by 3 par-
ties: a Member State of the UN, the Secretary General and the complainant, 
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subject to a décision by a screening committee composed of Member States 
représentatives. 
Review by the Court has only occurred in one case for each Tribunal13 
so that in practice, Tribunal judgments are final. 
NUMBER AND TYPE OF CASES 
In the period 1974-78,14 the UN Tribunal rendered 56 judgments, or an 
average of 11.2 per year - the ILO Tribunal rendered 143 judgments, an 
average of 28.6 per year. In relation to the 46,000 persons employed by 
organizations, this represents the very small percentage of 4% for the 5 year 
period. 
For the same period, the types of cases submitted to the Tribunals are 
shown on table 1. 
Only one grievant out of four had full or part satisfaction from the 
ILO Tribunal while half of the cases submitted to the UN Tribunal succeed-
ed in full or in part. 
TABLE 1 
Types of Cases Submitted to the Tribunals 
Claims Concernée! With: UN Tribunal ILO Tribunal 
UN Pensions 9 NIL 
(Not Compétent) 
Terminations (a) 19 43 
Employment conditions (b) 23 85 
Revision or Interprétation of a Previous 
Judgment 5 4 
Withdrawal of a Complaint (Not Recorded) 11 
(a) Includes non-extension of fixed-term contracts, termination for unsatisfactory perform-
ance or misconduct, abandonment of post, abolition of post and réduction in force. 
(b) Includes issues of salaries, indemnities, allowances, service-incurred accidents or illnesses, 
performance and conduct, classification of posts, transfers, entitlement to pensions. 
13 Advisory Opinion of 23 October 1956 (ILO Tribunal judgment) and of 12 July 1973 
(UN Tribunal judgment), International Court of Justice Reports, 1956, p. 77 and 1973, p. 166. 
H Period considered relevant by the Tribunals secrétariats in terms of average workload, 
as quoted by G.W. WATTLES in his study, doc. CCAQ/PER/R.107, Annex II, 5 September 
1979, p. 46. 
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AWARDS 
The number of claims admitted in full or in part, or rejected, was for 
the same period is shown in Table 2: 
TABLE 2 
Claims Admitted or Rejected 
1974-1978 UN Tribunal ILO Tribunal 
(a) Claims admitted in full or in part 28 34 
(b) Claims rejected 28 98 
(c) Percentage of claims admitted in full 
or in part vs. total 50% 25.7% 
When a Tribunal found in favour of a complainant, the Judges quash-
ed the contested décision and ordered performance of the obligation invok-
ed. Examples of such décisions follow. 
In case 233, the effect of a promotion from one category to another 
was to reduce an employee's total rémunération through an oddity of the 
salary structure. The ILO Tribunal ordered the organization to pay a salary 
supplément to correct this anomaly. In case 247, the Tribunal ordered pay-
ment of a yearly within grade salary increase which had been withheld on er-
roneous reasons of law and fact. In case 292, the Tribunal decided that the 
complainant was entitled to recover from the organization sums underpaid 
to him as educational allowance for his children. In case 342, the Tribunal 
ordered the rétroactive promotion of the complainant to a higher grade, 
and granted him $4,000 for his costs. In case 274, the complainant challeng-
ed the validity of two written reprimands for misconduct on the grounds 
that thèse related to Staff Council activities. The Tribunal affirmed that a 
Staff Council member has no immunity from disciplinary measures, but 
quashed one of the 2 reprimands and remitted the other to the Director-
General for reconsideration. In case 272, the Tribunal decided that the place 
of résidence of a Peruvian employée recruited in Peru to work in 
Washington, D.C. was Lima and not the duty station. This décision entail-
ed payment of a non-resident's allowance, home leave travel every two 
years and other benefits. In case 245, the Tribunal ordered the extension of 
the complainant's contract by 13 days, to a total of 5 years' duration, thus 
entitling him to a pension under the UN Pension Fund rules. 
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In case 215, the UN Tribunal found that a periodic performance 
évaluation report was inaccurate and misleading and ordered that its judg-
ment be incorporated in the complainant's service record to supplément and 
correct the contested report. 
In cases when spécifie performance was not thought possible or ad-
visable, the Tribunal ordered financial compensation. In some cases, finan-
cial compensation for physical or moral damage was granted in addition to 
ordering performance. 
Indemnisation varies, of course, according to the cases. In 1974-1978, 
the UN Tribunal awarded once 3 years' salary, once 2 years' salary, twice 1 
year's salary, and three times 6 months salary indemnities. Financial awards 
not based on salary period ranged from $800 to $26,000. Moral damage was 
rated $1,000. The ILO Tribunal also granted a 3 year salary indemnity, a 2 
year and two 1 year indemnities. Financial awards unrelated to salary 
periods ranged from $400 to $20,000. Compensation for moral damage, 
plus costs, was rated $16,000 in one case and $20,500 in another. In 1980, 
the ILO Tribunal has raised its awards to $50,000 in one case and $210,000 
in another.15 
STAFF ASSOCIATIONS' DISSATISFACTION WITH THE TRIBUNALS 
Staff Associations déplore that complainants may win their cases and 
lose their jobs.16 This is true and the reason is one of expediency. After long 
and often bitter litigation, can an employer be expected to reemploy the 
dissatisfied but triumphant employée? Although empowered to order 
reinstatement without option, the ILO Tribunal has very rarely forced 
organizations to re-engage a former employée. In the United Kingdom, In-
dustrial Tribunals are also empowered to order re-employment. If the 
employer fails to comply with the order, the Tribunal can only increase the 
amount of compensation payable.17 
Employée associations also complain of excessive delays in the recourse 
process. In fact, the UN Tribunal deals promptly with its cases, an average 
of six months between the date of introduction of the complaint and the 
date of the judgment. The ILO Tribunal takes longer, an average of 14 
15 ILO Tribunal judgments no. 361, 367, 431, and 402. 
16 Peter OZORIO, "Winning your Case but Losing your Job" , in WHO Diaglogue, 
Geneva, no. 81, June-July 1980. 
n Brian CAPSTICK, "Industrial Tribunals: Giving a Fair Service", Personnel Manage-
ment, London, vol. 11, no. 12, December 1979. 
340 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 37. NO 2 (1982) 
months.18 Such durations are not extraordinary for a judicial body. 
However, they are added to the time taken by internai appeal bodies to 
review the cases and by the Executive Head to convey his décision. 
For instance, an FAO staff member, Mr. A.Z., had his contract ter-
minated on 10 April 1976. He appealed against this décision to the FAO Ap-
peals Committee on 5 April 1976, but he was informed only on 13 March 
1978 that the Director General had dismissed his appeal. He then appealed 
to the ILO Tribunal on 1 May 1978 and the case was ready in October 1978. 
The Tribunal rendered his judgment no. 389 on 24 April 1980, four years 
after his contract was terminated. In this unfortunate case, there were ex-
cessive delays both at the internai appeal and at the Tribunal stages. 
Delays experienced by appellants at the UN Joint Appeals Board range 
from 2 to 4 years,19 which is also unacceptable. In such cases, the internai 
recourse process within the organization takes even longer than the judicial 
process. As neither process suspends the impugned administrative décision, 
several years may elapse after a staff member has been terminated, before a 
final judgment is rendered. 
To alleviate the effect of such delays, the staff associations want the in-
ternai appeal bodies and the Tribunals to acquire the power to order conser-
vatory measures, including stay of exécution, when the décision appealed 
against is likely to hâve particularly serious or irréparable conséquences.20 
This proposai is, however, unacceptable to the organizations, as it would in-
fringue upon the management responsibilities of the heads of secrétariats. 
The staff représentatives also feel that the Tribunals should resort more 
frequently to oral proceedings, which would increase the confidence of the 
employées. This approach is addressed mainly to the ILO Tribunal which 
has in récent years ruled on cases exclusively on written submissions, while 
the UN Tribunal has oral proceedings in one out of five cases on an average. 
Whether to hâve oral proceedings or not is, of course, for the Tribunals to 
décide. Oral proceedings are costly in time and travel expenses, and are re-
quired only when facts are in doubt. 
Finally, staff associations claim that they should be entitled to initiate 
litigations before Tribunals in their own name and that they should hâve the 
right of intervention in individual proceedings through amicus curiae briefs. 
18 Based on judgments rendered by the UN Tribunal in 1977 and 1978 and by the ILO 
Tribunal in 1978 and 1979. 
19 M. GEORGHEGAN, "Joint Appeals Board", Secrétariat News, UN, New York, 
15 August 1980. 
20 Note by FICSA on Recourse Procédures in the Organizations of the UN System, doc. 
ACCI1980/PER/29 of 9 July 1980. 
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At présent, the Tribunals admit only individual complaints. Their Statutes 
do not allow them to accept complaints filed by associations or unions. 
Amicus curiae briefs from the staff association hâve been allowed by the 
UN Tribunal, but not by the ILO Tribunal, unless the staff spokesman 
himself had rights or interests which could be affected by the resolution of 
the case. 
In spite of thèse discrepancies and limitations, the right of appeal to in-
dependent Tribunals has given the UN employées a necessary and indepen-
dent counterweight to the powers and prérogatives of the executive heads. 
The Tribunals hâve exercised their control over the proper application of 
Rules and Régulations to individual cases and hâve censured improper 
motives. They hâve reinforced security of employment, by reducing the 
contractual élément in the légal situation of UN employée and by stressing 
the career expectancy concept. 
CONCLUSION 
Informai and formai grievance procédures are available to ail staff of 
UN organizations through conciliation or médiation, appeals to internai 
boards and access to independent Tribunals. 
Procédures vary in various organizations. A few rely on a house Om-
budsman, while ILO has an original review process. In most organizations, 
the staff associations or union play a significant rôle in helping individuals 
submit grievances or in obtaining fair settlements. 
Internai appeal boards are useful to gather and assess facts and 
documents, to make recommendations related to structure, politics and Per-
sonal circumstances in organizations as well as to administrative rules. The 
board's recommendations are, however, not binding on the Executive 
Heads. 
The Tribunals are independent and their décisions must be im-
plemented. However, the UN Tribunal cannot order re-employment of an 
employée and the ILO Tribunal has only done so twice. The only remedy is 
then financial and financial awards hâve in the past been relatively modest 
(the ILO Tribunal has recently raised substantially the sums awarded to suc-
cessful complainants). On the other hand, most cases are not related to ter-
mination of employment, and the Tribunals hâve contributed to ensuring 
the respect of the rule of law and to reinforcing the international civil ser-
vice concept. 
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In spite of their imperfections and slow pace, the grievance and 
recourse procédures are an essential guarantee to UN employées that their 
case will be heard and that they are not wholly dépendent on the good or 
bad will, fairness or arbitrariness of their supervisors or employers. Fur-
thermore, the Tribunal's jurisprudence and recourse procédures generally 
act as regulators, guides, and deterrents for UN managers. The organiza-
tions also benefit by having claims and grievances reviewed by boards with 
employée participation and tribunals, a protection against member state in-
terférences. 
Altogether, in spite of occasional irritation shown by the administra-
tions against «staff-oriented» judgments and staff complaints against the 
imperfections and slowness of justice, the grievance and recourse pro-
cédures available to UN employées can be considered generally adéquate. 
Les voies de recours individuel 
dans les secrétariats des Nations Unies 
Les organisations des Nations Unies, en dépit de leurs objectifs sociaux ambi-
tieux, ne sont pas mieux protégées contre les conflits internes entre employés et 
employeurs que les bureaucraties nationales ou les entreprises privées. 
Comme de nombreuses entreprises dans le cadre national, elles ont instauré des 
procédures de recours destinées à examiner et si possible régler ces conflits, pour 
éviter que des problèmes individuels ne se transforment en conflits collectifs. 
Contrairement aux sociétés ou administrations nationales, les organisations in-
ternationales ne sont pas soumises aux législations nationales du travail et leurs 
employés ne peuvent pas recourir aux tribunaux civils ou juridictions du travail. Les 
conditions d'emploi et relations de travail employés/employeurs dans ces organisa-
tions sont précisées dans des statuts et règlements du personnel autonomes, approu-
vés par les États membres et mis en oeuvre par les administrations internationales. 
Tous les aspects de la gestion du personnel, recrutement, contrats, salaires et indem-
nités, pensions, discipline, évaluation du personnel et voies de recours ont été 
élaborés en fonction des caractéristiques des organisations internationales, indépen-
damment des lois et pratiques de tel ou tel pays. 
Les 46,000 employés des organisations des Nations Unies ont accès à des voies 
de recours qui comprennent la conciliation ou la médiation, les recours à des comités 
internes d'appel et à des Tribunaux indépendants. 
Les procédures internes varient dans les différentes organisations. L'Organisa-
tion mondiale de la Santé, l'UNESCO et le Programme des Nations Unies pour le 
Développement emploient un médiateur (Ombudsman) pour arbitrer les conflits in-
dividuels entre l'employé et l'administration, l'employé et son chef ou ses collègues. 
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Le médiateur peut également enquêter sur des problèmes de conditions d'emploi ou 
de travail et formuler des propositions. Il conseille mais ne décide pas. Au Bureau in-
ternational du travail et dans d'autres organisations, l'employé peut se faire aider ou 
représenter par un délégué du syndicat ou association du personnel, pour présenter 
ses doléances et obtenir un règlement équitable. 
Si la conciliation échoue, l'employé peut soumettre son cas formellement à un 
comité interne paritaire chargé d'étudier les faits, d'obtenir toute la documentation 
nécessaire et d'examiner si le règlement du personnel a été correctement appliqué. À 
la suite d'une procédure contradictoire, le comité formule ses recommandations au 
Directeur général de l'organisation, qui prendra librement une décision définitive. 
Si l'employé n'accepte pas cette décision, il peut enfin saisir un des deux Tribu-
naux administratifs internationaux, le Tribunal des Nations Unies à New York ou le 
Tribunal de l'Organisation internationale du Travail à Genève, qui a succédé au 
Tribunal de la Société des Nations. Les Tribunaux sont indépendants des secrétariats 
internationaux et leurs jugements sont exécutoires. S'ils reconnaissent le bien fondé 
de la requête, les juges peuvent annuler la décision administrative contestée, ou or-
donner l'exécution de l'obligation invoquée. Si cette annulation ou cette exécution 
n'est pas possible ou opportune, le Tribunal peut attribuer au requérant une indem-
nité pour le préjudice matériel ou moral souffert. 
Les cas soumis aux Tribunaux concernent des problèmes de traitements, 
d'allocations, d'accidents du travail, d'évaluation des services et règles de conduite, 
classement des postes, mutations, droit à la pension, non renouvellement ou résilia-
tion de contrats. Dans ces derniers cas, les Tribunaux n'ont que très rarement or-
donné le ré-emploi du personnel licencié, mais ont préféré accorder une indemnisa-
tion. 
Les organisations ont intérêt à ce que les plaintes des employés soient examinées 
par des comités statutaires et les Tribunaux pour éviter des pressions des États mem-
bres en faveur de leurs ressortissants. 
Malgré leurs imperfections, les voies de recours garantissent aux employés des 
organisations des Nations Unies que leurs requêtes seront examinées avec impar-
tialité et que leur situation administrative ne dépend pas entièrement de la bonne ou 
mauvaise volonté de leurs chefs ou employeurs, ou de leur équité ou arbitraire. En 
particulier la jurisprudence des Tribunaux administratifs a institué des limites juridi-
ques aux larges pouvoirs discrétionnaires des chefs de secrétariats, a contribué au res-
pect du droit et a renforcé le concept de la permanence et de l'indépendance de la 
fonction publique internationale. 
